The Prospects for a U.S.-Burma Thaw

by Roberto Tofani
World Politics Review

The recent release of Burmese democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi could produce, as a ripple effect, a shift in the relationship between Burma and the U.S.

Suu Kyi has stated that she intends to pursue reconciliation with the junta. This, in turn, could suit Washington’s softening stance toward the regime and the Obama administration’s stated preference for alternative policies in dealing with Burma.

Suu Kyi’s decision is dictated by the reality on the ground. Her National League for Democracy party (NLD), which won 1990 elections that were never recognized domestically, was disbanded after it boycotted the November 2010 parliamentary elections. Those polls resulted in the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) gaining a majority in the two national legislative chambers. The National Democratic Front (NDF) — an independent offshoot of the NLD — is to be the largest opposition party in the upcoming parliament, with 16 out of 161 representatives. Twenty-five percent of the seats in the chambers are set aside for representatives of the military.

With the junta also controlling the country’s security apparatus, Suu Kyi’s first priority is to establish a dialogue with Burma’s other democratic forces — connections that are currently lacking. Than Nyein, NDF chairman, told WPR, “We don’t think to create alliances with other parties, and we have no dialogue with NLD members.”

According to sources, Suu Kyi is also planning to work toward building a political program and a new political network, relying on the young and, especially, on student groups. “The Lady,” as she is affectionately known among her local supporters, is barred from directly taking part in the political process under a 2008 constitutional stipulation that forbids those married to foreigners from running for office. Suu Kyi’s British husband, Michael Aris, died in 1999. Fresh recruits could thus serve as possible front candidates for a newly formed party.

Suu Kyi’s two-track approach, however, assumes that the junta will continue to maintain a period of relative political calm. The resulting national context could, in turn, facilitate a thaw in U.S.-Burma relations.

The U.S. has historically been outspoken against the junta, with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dubbing Burma an “outpost of tyranny” In 2005. The George W. Bush administration’s tough stance included restrictive policies such as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008. The former sanctioned the junta and aimed to support democratic forces within Burma, mirroring British policy toward Burma. It also recognized the NLD as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people. The second act barred Burmese gemstones from entering the United States via third countries.

By contrast, President Barack Obama has turned over a new leaf.

Obama did condemn the November elections as “neither free nor fair.” However, in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the U.S. acknowledged that neither sanctions nor engagement had nudged the military rulers toward democratic reforms, and that the U.S. was reviewing its policy toward Burma. The new policy, announced in September 2009, is a classic carrot-and-stick approach, with the U.S. agreeing to talk to the junta and to relax sanctions if certain conditions are met. This approach is supported by U.S. business interests, with Tami Overby, vice president for Asia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, calling on Congress to consider easing the sanctions if at all possible.

U.S.-Burma economic cooperation could be spearheaded by private firms freed to do business in a country that is rich in gas, oil and other resources. At present, companies with investments or agreements in Burma dating before May 21, 1997, are exempted from sanctions. The exemption includes a partnership between the U.S. oil corporation Unocal, now a subsidiary of Chevron, and the French corporation Total covering natural-gas exploration and an offshore pipeline running across Burma into Thailand — a project that provides between $400 million to $647 million in annual revenue to Burma’s government.

Suu Kyi’s re-engagement in the political process could make it easier for Obama to loosen sanctions and increase U.S. engagement with the junta. Suu Kyi has already indicated her support for a softening of the sanctions, especially if they are found to be more damaging to ordinary citizens than to the regime.

The Dec. 10 meeting between Suu Kyi and Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun is one indication that this course may be pursued. Yun also met with Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win, which could indicate that the junta itself is more open to talks with Washington.

Partial engagement between the U.S. and the junta could also work as a shield for Suu Kyi, who remains vulnerable to the junta’s whims. Currently, the junta has shown no interest in engaging her, even after her meeting with Yun.

In the medium to long term, a thaw in relations could also open the door to possible discussions on the worrying prospect of a nuclear-armed junta. As confirmed by U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, quoted by the Guardian, this remains a serious concern for the U.S.

The prospect of a U.S.-Burma engagement, however, rests on the assumption that the junta and Suu Kyi find a new modus vivendi. By all indications, Washington has a role to play in promoting this outcome.